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Roger J. Traynor was appointed to the Supreme Court of California
in 194o and served as its Chief Justice from 1964 to 1970.' He is best
known today for his judicial innovations in the fields of conflict of laws,
product liability, and civil procedure His decisions on miscegenation,
divorce, police searches and product liability were ahead of his time, and
guided California's legal system into the future. His most significant
opinions included rejecting the legal prohibition of inter-racial marriages,
adopting a no-fault divorce, restricting police searches and applying a
strict standard of liability in product defect cases
However, few are aware of Roger J. Traynor's contributions to the
field of tax law, where, through academic, administrative, and judicial
service, he developed valuable principles that still prevail today. At the
University of California at Berkeley, Traynor discovered his passion for
tax law, and inspired his students to take this path in their professional
careers.4 As an administrator, Traynor served California's tax system
tremendously by shaping some of today's most important local tax acts,
which were adopted by other states and countries.' Later on, Traynor
* S.J.D. Candidate, University of California, Los Angeles. I would like to thank Julie Makinen,
Kirk Stark, Steven Bank, Martin Shapiro, and Ilan Benshalom for their insightful comments on drafts
of this Article. I also thank the California Supreme Court Historical Society for choosing this Article
as winner of the 2007 Writing Competition. A shorter version of this Article will be published in the
2008 volume of the Society's journal, California Legal History, and will appear on the Society's
Web site (www.cschs.org). Finally, I am grateful to my family, most especially my husband Tamir for
his constant love and support.
I. Adrian A. Kragen, In Memoriam: Roger J. Traynor: Chief Justice Traynor and the Law of
Taxation, 5 HASTINGS L.J. 8oI, 802 (1984).
2. Id. at 8ol.
3. BEN FIELD, AcTIvIsM IN PURSUIT OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CHIEF
JUSTICE ROGER J. TRAYNOR, at XIV (2003).
4. On his academic interest in tax law, see Elizabeth Roth, The Two Voices of Roger Traynor, 27
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 269, 295 (1983). and James E. Sabine, Taxation: A Delicately Planned Arrangement
of Cargo, 53 CAL. L. REV. 173 (1965).
5. Kragen, supra note I, at 803.
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became an expert consultant to the Treasury and participated in drafting
major federal tax legislation. As a California Supreme Court justice,
Traynor wrote decisions in the field of state tax law that remain good
law, and provide guidance for complicated issues including, for example,
computing estate tax marital deductions, and the earnings and profits of
corporations. What would be surprising to many people, however, would
be to learn of Traynor's partnership and important work with Stanley S.
Surrey, one of "our nation's foremost authorities on federal tax law," and
"the leading proponent of tax reform" during his life.6
Surrey was the ultimate tax professor and a "True Public Servant,"
as a Harvard law dean and tax professor once said.7 In 1933, he joined
the New Deal administration and established himself as a highly ranked
8legal counsel at the Treasury Department. In 1951, he joined the
Harvard Law School faculty, where he remained an active member for
thirty years9 while continuing to serve as a consultant to the United
States Government and as an advisor at the United Nations on
international tax projects.'" However, his best known and most important
6. See The Townsend Harris Medal, http://www.ccny.cuny.edu/townsend-harris/awards/s-z.htm
(last visited Mar. I7, 2008).
7. Erwin N. Griswold, In Memoriam: Stanley S. Surrey-A True Public Servant, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 329,329, 331 (1984).
8. Stanley Surrey worked in the National Recovery Administration in Washington from 1933 to
1935 and at the National Labor Relations Board from 1935 to 1937. Walter Sterling Surrey, in STANLEY
S. SURREY i9io-i984: PROGRAM OF A MEMORIAL SERVICE HELD OCT. 3, 1984 AT MEMORIAL CHURCH,
HARVARD UNIVERSITY (1984) [hereinafter SURREY MEMORIAL SERVICE] (on file with author). In those
positions, Surrey found a meaningful outlet to improving government policies. Id. The New Deal was
also a significant influence on Stanley Surrey. Id.
9 9. At Harvard, even as professor emeritus, Surrey continued to participate in many projects,
such as the Income Tax Project of the American Law Institute. Erwin W. Griswold, in SURREY
MEMORIAL SERVICE, supra note 8. He organized the International Program in Taxation at Harvard,
produced the World Tax Series, and published various tax books and articles. Id. He was the president
of the National Tax Association from 1979 to 198o and through it published major tax articles. Id.
Surrey wrote twenty books and ninety-seven articles, not including legislative records. James
Vorenberg, in SURREY MEMORIAL SERVICE, supra note 8.
so. Surrey's contribution to the development of international tax systems was vast. He was
instrumental in formulating tax treaties between developed and developing countries, and in
developing the new tax system that evolved after World War II. For example, he was responsible for
the adoption of Resolution A.3, adopted at the Conference of Punta del Este in I96i, by which
member governments of the Organization of American States explicitly endorsed a program to
reinforce tax systems. Milton Katz, in SURREY MEMORIAL SERVICE, supra note 8. The Resolution was
adopted by "the Pan American Union, the Economic Commission for Latin America, and the Inter-
American Development Bank, in cooperation with the Harvard University Law School International
Program in Taxation" in August I96I. Id. Between 1949 and 1950, Surrey participated in planning and
developing a new tax system for Japan, as a member of the American Tax Mission to Japan. Erwin W.
Griswold, in SURREY MEMORIAL SERVICE, supra note 8. Surrey reported his mission was most
importantly to devise "a simple and progressive system," which was later acclaimed for "Japan's
dazzling economic performance and rapid growth since World War II." Id. (quotations omitted): see
also Erwin N. Griswold, In Memoriam: Stanley S. Surrey, 98 HARV. L. REV. 329, 331 (1984). In 1960, he
joined his Harvard colleague Oliver Oldman in a research project on the tax system of Argentina.
STANLEY S. SURREY & OLIVER OLDMAN, REPORT OF A PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF THE TAX SYSTEM OF
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work was formulating the tax expenditure concept. As assistant secretary
for tax policy in the Treasury Department, Surrey promoted the
legislation establishing today's tax expenditures section of the
government's budget." The tax expenditures section enumerates
incentives provided through the tax system, thus emphasizing their
oversized component of the income tax system. His aim was to raise
public awareness of the extent to which the government subsidizes
certain activities through the tax code. After his retirement, Surrey
continued to update and publish volumes of his famous textbooks on
taxation, such as "Federal Income Taxation: Cases and Materials"" and
"Federal Wealth Transfer Taxation: Cases and Materials,"'3 casebooks
that continue to be widely used by tax educators.
Little is known about the strong bond between Traynor and Surrey,
who both commenced their careers in the tax law field, and have had an
enduring impact on the American tax system. Traynor collaborated with
Surrey during President Roosevelt's second term, towards the end of the
Great Depression, when the top marginal tax rate climbed back to its
World War I-era maximum of 78%."4 The high marginal tax rates
intensified the friction between taxpayers and the government, boosted
litigation, and multiplied the number of tax disputes.
At this crucial juncture in the late 193Os, Traynor and Surrey called
for a substantial transformation of existing mechanisms for settling tax
disputes. During these years, an overload of tax litigation had created
inequities that increased the public's discomfort with the tax system.' 6
The Bureau of Internal Revenue labored under the burden of individual
and corporate tax disputes. When Congress established the U.S. Board
of Tax Appeals ("the Board") in the Revenue Act of 1924," it initially
considered it a technical, tax expert tribunal within the the Bureau of
ARGENTINA (I960).
I I. See generally Stanley Surrey, Tax Expenditures and the Budget, in TAX POLICY AND TAX
REFORM, 196i-I969: SELECTED SPEECHES AND TESTIMONY (William F. Hellmuth & Oliver Oldman eds.,
1973); Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970).
12. STANLEY S. SURREY, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (1986).
13. STANLEY S. SURREY ET AL., FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
(1987).
14. In i918, the top marginal tax rate was 77%, and between i9i9 and 1921 it was 73%. In the
period following World War I, the maximum rates declined gradually and their lowest level was 24%
in 1929. During the Depression period that followed the stock market crash, the top marginal tax rate
increased rapidly to 79% in 1936 and continued this trend in the Second World War to a top of 94% in
1945. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, SOl TAX STATS-HISTORICAL TABLE 23 [hereinafter TABLE 23],
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/histaba.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2008).
15. Roger J. Traynor & Stanley S. Surrey, New Roads Toward the Settlement of Federal Income,
Estate, and Gift Tax Controversies, 7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 336, 338 (1940).
16. Id.
17. Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176 § 900, 43 Stat. 336 (1924).
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Internal Revenue, a branch of the Treasury Department, which would
later be renamed the Internal Revenue Service.' 8 The Board was
designed to serve as a professional mediator between taxpayers and the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, rather than to function as a court.'9
However, the absence of filing fees prompted taxpayers to take their
disputes to the Board." Traynor and Surrey demonstrated that on
average, it took the Board three years to issue a decision. Most of the
cases involved a relatively small dollar amount and a focus on questions
of fact, which for the most part could have been resolved more quickly,
and at lower expense, through administrative measures rather than the
adversarial judicial procedures of the Board.'
Traynor and Surrey criticized this inefficient system of adjudication
and proposed ways to minimize litigation through what they called a
"preventive tax policy" which was "designed to prevent controversies
from arising" and, where they could not be prevented, "to reduce the
area in which they occur." 2 Their idea of preventive tax policy entailed
reducing the complexity of the tax code and improving the administrative
resolution of tax cases, thereby minimizing disputes over tax matters.
They called for more flexibility of the tax system by decentralizing the
administrative and judicial systems into more divisions and granting
them more authority in cases of income, estate, and gift tax. 3 Traynor
and Surrey contended that the dispute resolution process had lost its
effectiveness and clarity due to complexity added by judicial
interpretation. "Too much law,"24 they said, caused taxpayers to seek out
expensive legal advice in order to "thread their way through the
complicated maze of tax law." 5 Another aspect of Traynor and Surrey's
proposal was to limit appellate reviews and institute a single court of tax
appeals in various locations.26
Ultimately, Traynor was appointed to the judicial bench, eventually
becoming Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of California, while Surrey
excelled in Harvard's faculty and in the executive branch as Assistant
Legislative Counsel to the United States Treasury. However, when they
18. T.D. 6038, 1953-2 C.B. 443.
19. Stephen C. Gara, Challenging the Finality of Tax Court Judgments: When Is Final Not Really
Final?, 20 AKRON TAX J. 35, 38 (2005).
2o. Roger J. Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure for Federal Income, Estate, and Gift
Taxes-a Criticism and a Proposal, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 1393,1394 (1938).
21. Id. at 1394.
22. Traynor & Surrey, supra note 15, at 352.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 351. This exact phrase was also used by Justice Robert H. Jackson. Kirk Stark, The
Unfulfilled Tax Legacy of Justice Robert H. Jackson, 54 TAX L. REV. 171, 187 (2oo1). He claimed that
the elaborate tax system was "too much law, and too many kinds of law, and from too many sources,
for tax administration to be simple, or the law clear." Id.
25. Traynor & Surrey, supra note 15, at 351.
26. Id. at 349.
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proposed their preventive tax policy, they were both Treasury
consultants. This Article will explore the joint project of these
extraordinary men in its historical context and its implementation in
Traynor's adjudication of tax disputes. Through legal-historical analysis,
this Article also examines the taxpayer-government relationship in view
of changes in politics, economics, and culture in the interwar years.
The tax policy community continues to debate questions concerning
the scope and nature of tax law, and the role of the judiciary and
administrative agencies in its development.27 Thus, it is important to
study the objectives of the individuals who helped to shape tax laws in
order to continue this legislative chain of intent. Traynor and Surrey's
idea of preventive tax policy was instrumental in shaping our current tax
system. The introduction of a closing agreement for a future transaction,
and today's private letter ruling, originated as a result of their proposal.
Their suggestion to create a single court of tax appeals continues to be
deliberated. Their philosophy can serve today as a valuable guide for
reducing the complexity and vagueness inherent in our tax system, and
for improving the relationship between taxpayers and the government.
Following this brief introduction, Parts II and III provide a historical
overview of the development of the tax system between 1913 and 1940
and detail the administrative and judicial problems at that time, as a
background for Traynor and Surrey's work. Part IV tells the story of
Traynor's tax education and how he met Surrey, along with an outline of
their proposal to improve the interwar tax system. Part V describes the
success of implementing preventive tax policy in the U.S. tax system,
specifically in Traynor's decisions. Finally, Part VI summarizes the
importance of preventive tax policy at a turning point in history and
Traynor and Surrey's effect on today's tax system.
I. THE INCOME TAX SYSTEM IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD
Taxing the income of individuals by the United States government
began during the Civil War,5 and the income tax appeared intermittently
in various forms until it was constitutionalized in i913.' 9 That year, the
remaining three states ratified the Sixteenth Amendment,3" which
27. See, e.g., Francis M. Allegra, Section 482: Mapping the Contours of the Abuse of Discretion
Standard of Judicial Review, 13 VA. TAX REV. 423,453 (1994) (discussing the role of the judiciary in the
development of tax law); Jennifer C. Root, The Commissioner's Clear Reflection of Income Power
Under 446(B) and the Abuse of Discretion Standard of Review: Where Has the Rule of Law Gone, and
Can We Get It Back?, 15 AKRON TAX J. 69, 74-76 (200o) (describing the role of administrative agencies
and the IRS in the development of tax law).
28. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432 (1862).
29. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 2,38 Stat. 166-67 (93).
30. JOHN F. WITrE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 79 (1985); see
also Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of "Incomes," 33
ARiz. ST. L.J. 1057, 1073-77 (2001) (discussing the ratification process).
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authorized Congress to impose taxes on income without apportionment
by population, and from then on a federal income tax system became a
permanent statutory reality. The first income tax bill was modest,
imposing graduated rates with a maximum rate of 7% and large
exemptions.3 The campaign for introducing the income tax was led
mainly by the states, which struggled to raise revenue and endured heavy
federal tariffs and excise taxes.32 State representatives argued for an
income tax by emphasizing that it would be a progressive tax; that is, it
would tax people according to their ability to pay. However, while
progressive ideas of redistributing wealth and promoting equality were
part of the public debate, congressional debates focused on the income
tax as a suitable device to raise the revenue necessary anticipated for the
forthcoming war.33
Until 1916, moderate tax rates and large exemptions resulted in little
added revenue for the Treasury, and the new income tax remained a
marginal source of income for the federal government.34 Excise taxes and
tariffs accounted for 90% of federal government receipts; thus the new
income tax affected few people.35 However, the U.S. decision to enter
World War I in April, 1917, resulted in higher defense expenses, and the
government turned to the income tax knowing it would generate
immediate revenue needed to fund defense costs.
6
The collective political agreement in Congress to enter the war
reflected the unified political atmosphere of the period, which gave rise
to bipartisan support for increasing the income tax burden.37 For the first
time, American armed forces were sent to fight on European soil. The
public mood seemed to be that it was the patriotic duty of the homeland
to make financial sacrifices to support the troops at the battlefront. 8 In
1916, income and corporate taxes accounted for 16% of government
revenue; by 1920 the figure had grown to 58.6%." In just a few short
years the maximum individual tax rate reached 77%.4' The government
raised $13.5 billion between 1917 and 1920, primarily from progressive
taxes on individual incomes and corporate profits, and reduced its heavy
31. Revenue Act of 1913, § 2,38 Stat. 166-67.
32. ELLIOT W. BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 40-45 (1996).
33. WITrE, supra note 30, at 83.
34. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Fact Sheet on the History of the U.S. Tax System,
http://www.treas.gov/education/fact-sheets/taxes/ustax.shtml (last visited Mar. 17, 2008).
35. Id.
36. See BROWNLEE, supra note 32, at 58-78; see also JOHN STEELE GORDON, HAMILTON'S BLESSING:
THE EXTRAORDINARY LIFE OF OUR NATIONAL DEBT 104 (1997).
37. Id.
38. See DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN SOCIETY (i980)
(providing a detailed study of the American home front and society on the eve of the war).
39. WrrrE, supra note 30.
40. TABLE 23, supra note 14.
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reliance on import duties.' Scholar John F. Witte aptly summed up the
atmosphere of the period when he said: "[Tihe need for revenue ruled
the discussion over progressive arguments."4
Once the war was over and the government had paid for much of
those costs, there was a general desire for isolationism and steady
healing.43 Revisions to the income tax rate were no exception, and the
Republicans who regained power in the 1920S called for a "return to tax
normalcy."'  The maximum individual tax rate dropped from 77% in
1918 to 24% in I929.4' Attempts to increase the tax burden on individuals
and corporations with the explicit purpose of taxing accumulation of
wealth encountered heavy resistance in Congress.46 At that time, debates
on tax policy issues crossed party lines and created voting abnormalities
when Congress discussed new tax legislation.
From then on, tax policy became a major issue in public and political
discourse. 4i Tax legislation became more frequent, contributing to the
development of the tax code as well as the growing complexity of the tax
system. For example, taxation of businesses varied according to the size
of the entity and the nature of the organization.49 Special deductions,
credits, and other provisions made the tax code denser." Taxes on
individuals varied depending on the amount of their income, their type of
income, and the source of their income. At the same time, politicians and
scholars began to criticize the complexity of the tax code.5 Writing about
41. BROWNLEE, supra note 32, at 44. See generally WrrrE, supra note 30, at I io; Carolyn C. Jones,
Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the Expansion of the Income Tax During World
War 11, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685 (1989) (discussing the transformation of the tax system from a "class tax"
to a "mass tax").
42. WITTE, supra note 30, at 83.
43. President Harding recorded several speeches to the nation calling for a return to normalcy:
"America's present need is not heroics but healing; not nostrums but normalcy; not revolution but
restoration . . . not surgery but serenity." Warren G. Harding, U.S. President, Readjustment (May
14th, 1920), available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/ammem/index.html (search "all collections" for
"readjustment"; then follow "4. Readjustment" hyperlink under "Item Titles").
44. WITrE, supra note 30, at 89.
45. TABLE 23, supra note 14.
46. WITrE, supra note 3o , at Ioi.
47. Opposition toward Roosevelt's initiatives from members of his own Democratic party is an
example of such abnormalities. Id. at 102-04.
48. "Although government officials of earlier historical periods were aware that taxation affected
matters such as capital investments and regional industry, they did not deliberately manipulate
taxation to help manage the national economy." JULIAN E. ZELIZER, TAXING AMERICA: WILBUR D.
MILLS, CONGRESS AND THE STATE, 1945-1957, at 12-14 (1998). For a detailed description of the postwar
tax policy, see WITE, supra note 30.
49. WrrrE, supra note 30, at io8.
50. Sheldon D. Pollack, Tax Complexity, Reform, and the Illusions of Tax Simplification, 2 GEo.
MASON INDEP. L. REV. 319,328-34 (1994).
51. A movement for tax simplification led by T.S. Adams, a Yale economist, criticized the tax
bills for being too complex and suggested that in the future this complexity would be beyond patching.
WrIrE, supra note 30, at 91.
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how the T935 revenue act was enacted, Treasury official Randolph Paul
commented: "It is doubtful whether more than a handful of those who
remained on the floor understood the complicated 236 page measure."52
The role of the Treasury administration in shaping tax policy
increased during this period. The administration's activities shifted from
simply calculating the revenues and expenditures needed for war finance,
to planning ways to accomplish budgetary goals. Treasury officials thus
took on a major part in the politics of taxation. 3 They initiated revenue
legislation and participated in formulating revenue acts in tax
committees.54
In the late 193os, the legislative process reflected constant
compromise between the administration, which typically sought
expansion of the government, and Congress, which was dominated by
Republicans and Southern Democrats who generally opposed this
objective.5 The Great Depression was a decade of unemployment and
stagnancy. 6 President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal plan of relief
and social development programs between 1933 and 1938 involved
substantial expansion of the executive branch, and resulted in a need to
raise more revenue." As a result, the maximum individual tax rates were
increased to 63% in 1933 and reached 79% in I936. s The increased tax
rates lead to increased friction between taxpayers and the government.
This led to higher rates of tax evasion and multiplied the number of tax
disputes between individuals and the government. 9 The growing number
of tax disputes underscored the need for reform of administrative and
judicial settlement procedures.6
Several incidents in the late 1930s involving senators and
governmental officials exacerbated concerns about tax evasion.6'
52. Id. at 102.
53. The Roosevelt years began and ended with Congress taking the initiative, but the
administration was again the major actor in the important tax bills of 1935 and 1936. WnrE, supra note
30, at io9; see also BROWNLEE, supra note 32, at 8o.
54. BROWNLEE, supra note 32, at 57.
55. WITE, supra note 30, at 104-05.
56. See generally ROBERT S. McELVAINE, THE GREAT DEPRESSION: AMERICA, 1929-1941 (1993)
(discussing the social and economic consequences of the Great Depression).
57. W. Elliot Brownlee, The Public Sector, 3 CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIc HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 1039-40 (2OOO).
58. TABLE 23, supra note 14.
59. Assaf Likhovski, The Duke and the Lady: Helvering v. Gregory and the History of Tax
Avoidance Adjudication, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 953, 1000 (2004).
6o. Traynor & Surrey, supra note 15.
6I. Some of those tax avaidance incidents included officials of the Gulf Oil Corporation and the
Chairman of the Board of the National City Bank of New York, Charles E. Mitchell. Assaf Likhovski,
The Duke and the Lady: Helvering v. Gregory and the History of Tax Avoidance Adjudication, 25
CARDOZO L. REV. 953, Ioo7-O8 (2004). The most famous case concerned the Republican Treasury
Secretary Andrew Mellon. This case symbolized the political struggle between the New Deal
administration and Republicans. See Stark, supra note 24, at 189. Mellon was considered one of
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Roosevelt responded by campaigning for taxation of accumulated
wealth; Congress instead adopted a slow and conservative approach.62
Revenue acts were enacted almost every year in an attempt to close new
loopholes and halt the exploitation of tax laws by wealthy individuals and
corporations. 63 Reports published in 1937 described rich individuals
sheltering money in foreign holding corporations, and incorporating their
private yachts to escape taxation.6 In a bipartisan move, the government
established a special Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance.
Within weeks, the Committee produced a report on common evasion
techniIues used by the sixty-seven wealthiest families in the United
States. The report generated intense public reaction, and Congress
responded by unanimously passing an act applying strict limitations on
personal holding companies.6 It was clear at that time that compliance
levels had declined, and the relationship between taxpayers and the
government had deteriorated. As a result of those developments there
was a shift in tax legislation: whereas previously officials had cited a need
to raise revenue or a desire to make the tax system more progressive, the
tax acts of the late 1930s marked the beginning of complex and frequent
America's richest men, and he was responsible for tax policy and tax administration by virtue of his
duty as Secretary of Treasury. Senator James Couzens accused Mellon of corruption, illegal favorable
treatment of tax relief, granting tax benefits to Mellon's companies, and of reducing his income tax
return by creating artificial losses. Id. at 189-9o; see also BROWNLEE, supra note 32, at 79-8o; Assaf
Likhovski, The Story of Gregory: How Are Tax Avoidance Cases Decided?, in BUSINESS TAX STORIES
89, 123 (Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. Stark eds., 2005).
62. BROWNLEE, supra note 32, at 82.
63. BROWNLEE, supra note 32, at 94-97; SUSAN B. HANSEN, THE POLITICS OF TAXATION: REVENUE
WITHOUT REPRESENTATION 105 (1983) (discussing how tax revenues were misused to political
advantage as "Christmas tree" bills to confer benefits on many social groups); WITrE, supra note 30, at
IO3. For a different approach to the New Deal tax policy, see MARK H. LEFF, THE LIMrrs OF SYMBOLIC
REFORM: THE NEW DEAL AND TAXATION, 1933-1939, at 5-6 (1984) (arguing that the government tax
policy during those years was not meant to shift the tax burden, but rather was a rhetorical and
symbolic instrument).
64. Tax Evasion, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1937, at I6. In his 1936 re-election speech, Roosevelt
stormed against what he called "economic royalists," meaning rich tax evaders who used family trusts,
pension plans, and family partnerships to avoid high surtaxes and estate taxes. Text of Roosevelt's Tax
Evasion Message, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 1937, at 8. It so happened that Eleanor Roosevelt was also
suspected of tax avoidance activity by transferring money received for her radio performances. Kirk J.
Stark, The Unfulfilled Tax Legacy of Justice Robert H. Jackson, 54 TAX L. REV. 171, 259 n.87 (2001).
65. Report of the Joint Comm. on Tax Evasion and Avoidance of the Cong. of the United States,
H.R. Doc. No. 75-337 0937).
66. Revenue Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-377, § 337, 50 Stat. 813 (1937). This act contained
adjustments to the Revenue Act concerning personal holding companies and was the second act
passed addressing personal holding corporations. The previous act, which was enacted three years
earlier, defined personal holding companies as any corporation wherein 8o% or more of the
corporation's income was derived from certain passive-type income, and more than 5o% of the stock
was owned by five or fewer individuals. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 351, 48 Stat. 68o, 751 (1934).
Nevertheless, tax attorneys abused the 1934 act and developed sophisticated legal methods to avoid
entering into that definition and in 1937 the definition of "personal holding corporation" was altered.
March 2008]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
tax revisions enacted in response to tax evasion.67 As a result, taxpayers
increasingly sought advice from tax lawyers, and the courts were faced
with a high volume of tax disputes.68
In conclusion, the income tax underwent a major transformation
from the period of its adoption in 1913 to the eve of World War II.
Although it began as a "class tax" and a marginal source of revenue, it
became a "mass tax" with a highly progressive rate structure.69 From a
top rate of 7% in 1913, income was taxed at a maximum rate of 81% in
194.70 Consequently, the income tax developed into a major source of
revenue to fund government expansion and war expenses.7' Tax
compliance also changed dramatically throughout this period. Complex
tax laws and the cost of complying with those laws posed a major concern
of the government and the tax administration.72 In this climate, Traynor
acted to improve the interwar tax system. The next section will examine
how incoherent fiscal practices as well as inefficient institutional
structures overloaded the interwar tax system and created substantial
delays in resolving disputes. Those delays weakened the efficiency of the
tax system, created uncertainties and confusion, and threatened the
Treasury's ability to raise the necessary revenue.
II. INCOHERENT FISCAL PRACTICES AND Too MUCH LAW
A. BREAKDOWN OF JUDICIAL TAX REVIEW
In the midst of the 1920s, there was a general public discomfort with
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, which experienced difficulties coping
with administrative problems produced by the relatively new broad-
based income and profits tax.73 Congress recognized the need to reduce
the caseload of tax disputes and in 1924 established the Board of Tax
Appeals as an independent agency within the executive branch of the
government.74 Centralized in Washington, the Board was composed of
67. Assaf Likhovski, The Duke and the Lady: Helvering v. Gregory and the History of Tax
Avoidance Adjudication, 25 CARoozo L. REV. 953, 983 n.126 (2004) (quoting Learned Hand, Thomas
Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 169 (1947) (discussing tax complexity as a result of the anti-avoidance
approach)).
68. On the judiciary response to increasing tax evasion cases at that time, see Likhovski, supra
note 59, at 982.
69. See also EUGENE C. STEUERLE, THE TAX DECADE: How TAXES CAME TO DOMINATE THE PUBLIC
AOENDA 13 (1992); WITrE, supra note 30, at Ito. See generally Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass
Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the Expansion of the Income Tax During World War 11, 37 BUF. L.
REV. 685 (1989).
70. TABLE 23, supra note 14.
71. WITrE, supra note 30, at 130.
72. Likhovski, supra note 59, at 967-68.
73. Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., The United States Tax Court: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow,
Erwin N. Griswold Lecture Before the Annual Meeting of the American College of Tax Counsel, San
Antonio, Texas (Jan. 23, 1998), in 15 AM. J. TAX POL'Y I, 2 (1998).
74. Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 900,43 Stat. 253.
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seven members who were tax experts appointed by the president. It had
parallel jurisdiction with the District Courts and the Court of Claims in
suits for refund, and was subject to appellate review by the Circuit
Courts of Appeal.75 However, while the idea of establishing a special
judicial-like body to rapidly resolve tax controversies made good sense,
the Board had several weaknesses that defeated that purpose.
One of the Board's weaknesses was the fact that taxpayers could
choose from three courts that possessed original jurisdiction over tax
cases." Many taxpayers opted for the Board of Tax Appeals because, as
opposed to other jurisdictions, it did not require prepayment of tax
liability.77 Thus, the ease of filing a petition with the Board created a
heavy load of cases."
A second weakness of the Board was its limited jurisdiction. While
the Board maintained original jurisdiction over tax matters that
originated from a deficiency letter issued by the tax commissioner, it
lacked authority over refund claims or any overpayment cases.79 As a
result, an issue decided by the Board could have received a different
treatment in other federal courts, increasing the inconsistency of the tax
system.80
Another weakness of the Board was related to its geographical
location. Although the Board was based in Washington D.C., it had
jurisdiction throughout the United States.' The Board traveled to all
parts of the country, and appeared in each location once a year.
Therefore, it had to accumulate enough petitions to justify visiting a
certain location, which created huge delays and serious overload."
Because the Board was unable to hear most of the petitions filed with it,
it was only a matter of time until the Board would fail to function under
the sheer volume of the incoming petitions.
As a result of these weaknesses, and while "still very much in the
75. Id.
76. The taxpayer had the liberty to file a refund claim through the District Court or the Court of
Claims, or a petition with the Board of Tax Appeals. See Traynor, supra note 20, at 1403.
77. Id. at 1396.
78. Id. at 1395, 1400.
79. This limited jurisdiction originated prior to the establishment of the Board, when the District
Courts and the Court of Claims had the authority to adjudicate recovery of paid taxes and claims for
refunds. Id. at 1402-03.
8o. Id. at 1402-04.
8i. A 1934 study showed that over 90% of Board cases were outside of Washington; seven states
accounted for 59.5% of the cases, another seven states accounted for 16.9%, and the remaining 23%
were spread over thirty-four other states, which emphasized the geographical spread of tax disputes
before the Board. Id. at 1404-05.
82. "In fiscal year 1937-1938 the percentage of cases closed by Board decision after trial was only
i9.i percent- i,IO8 cases out of 5,799." Id. at 1396. "At the close of fiscal year 1938-1939 there were
7,864 cases involving $456,974,846 pending before the Board and the courts reviewing its decisions."
Traynor & Surrey, supra note 15, at 337-38.
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process of earning its reputation," 83 the Board of Tax Appeals struggled
to operate under an increasingly heavy load of petitions: 90.3% of cases
closed in 1934 involved tax years prior to 1931, "66.3[%] involved tax
years prior to 193o, and 37.3[%] involved tax years prior to 1929." 84
While waiting for a Board hearing, about 70% of petitions were closed
by settlement with the Bureau of Internal Revenue." However, nearly
5,000 new petitions were filed annually, leaving a large accumulation of
cases for the year to come." The great majority of the petitions involved
only small dollar amounts or concerned factual questions, both of which
could have been settled more efficiently and inexpensively between the
taxpayer and the Bureau of Internal Revenue in purely administrative
proceedings. 87 However, the tax system did not entail other mechanisms
to solve the cases that did not require judicial-like review, and thus the
system was inefficient.
B. DELAYS AND LACK OF INFORMATION
Taxpayers soon realized they could deliberately delay paying their
tax obligation by filing a claim with the Board of Tax Appeals because
the interwar tax system did not make a clear distinction between Board
and administrative review of a case. Filing a petition with the Board
should have marked the end of purely administrative review and the
beginning of quasi-judicial consideration; but in fact, cases remained in
administrative proceedings for at least two more years for further review
by various Bureau officers."
Although the majority of tax-dispute cases did not require judicial
resolution and neither the taxpayer nor the government officials believed
judicial review was necessary, delays in administrative settlement became
a negotiation tool for the parties.8 While Bureau officials had a common
goal of settling the case administratively to rapidly recover unpaid tax
liabilities, in reality, cases were pushed from one level to the next without
being resolved. Initially, Bureau of Internal Revenue field office agents
handled tax disputes.' If not resolved, the case was then transferred to
the Conference Division, the Technical Staff and, if necessary, reviewed
by the Office of Chief Counsel.9' If not resolved by then, the Appeals
83. Stark, supra note 24, at 195.
84. Traynor, supra note 20, at 1394.
85. Id. at 1394 n.3.
86. Traynor & Surrey, supra note i5, at 338 & n.ta.
87. See id. at 339 ("By the close of the fiscal year 1938-1939 over 56% of the petitions filed with
the Board involved amounts of less than $5,000 while over 38% involved amounts of less than
$2,0o0.").
88. Traynor, supra note 20, at 1400.
89. See id. at 1399-1400.




Division at the Bureau brought the case to the judicial level.92 At each
stage, Bureau officials had the authority to settle the tax dispute, whether
in the administrative or judicial stage. Of the cases that ended with an
agreement, about one-third were settled at the Technical Staff level and
two thirds by the Appeals Division.93
While Bureau agents often offered to settle cases, many were
reluctant to take responsibility for truly disposing of a case, knowing they
could shift that responsibility to various other officers in the Bureau.'
This gave taxpayers multiple settlement opportunities and encouraged
them to litigate. Taxpayers could make one argument contesting their
liability when they applied to the Board, then after multiple stages of
review by field agents and other officials in the bureaucracy, they could
assess which settlement offer was the best bargain.95 By paying a ten
dollar filing fee, a taxpayer who failed to pay his taxes or settle his case
with the administration could defer his tax liability by entering the long
Board line-even if he had not fully exhausted other settlement
mechanisms.
96
When the parties finally attended their long-awaited Board hearing,
they were often surprised to learn about new issues not mentioned in the
initial deficiency letter.97 Taxpayers' inability to provide complete details
in the petition to the Board, and the failure of the Bureau to demand full
disclosure of the facts, created further delays for the Board, which now
had to waste time compiling the necessary information. Had the
administration known all the facts of the case beforehand, some cases
would not have been disputed at all.98 Since neither the taxpayer nor the
commissioner could comprehend the correct legal treatment from the
meager facts stated in the deficiencies, the government-taxpayer
relationship was subjected to unnecessary strain and costs. At this point,
the taxpayer had already sought professional advice, the Bureau had
performed an investigation of the case, and the Board had to waste
valuable time on a factual investigation instead of engaging in quasi-
judicial review of important legal matters. This chain of events stemmed
from the failure to obtain complete and accurate information from
taxpayers before the Board hearing, and could have been avoided.
The constant delays in resolving tax disputes impaired tax collection,
increased the likelihood of taxpayer default, and resulted in a substantial
revenue loss for the government. Since years could pass between the
92. Id.
93. Id. at x394.
94- Id. at 1399.
95- Id.
96. Id. at 1400.
97. Id. at 1401.
98. Traynor, supra note 2o, at 1400-02.
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filing date of a dispute and the final resolution, by the time of resolution
the taxpayer might be in a different financial state, sometimes even
insolvent.' Taxpayers were not required to provide any type of security
when filing a petition with the Board. Consequently, in some cases, after
long deliberation an issue could become merely a theoretical matter, due
to the taxpayer's inability to pay the final judgment. In those days the
government lost substantial amounts of revenue due to delays during
which the taxpayer became unable to meet his full tax liability."w
C. COMPLEXITY AND UNCERTAINTY
The interwar tax system also produced high levels of confusion and
uncertainty. Typically, six years passed between the date of the return
and the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals. "As a rule, a case spent its
first three years in the Bureau of Internal Revenue and its last three
years in the Board of Tax Appeals."'' However, the tax dispute was not
over yet; many cases continued appellate litigation in the Circuit Courts
for another two years, while others made it to the Supreme Court for
another year. That meant it could take up to nine years for a tax dispute
to be finally settled.' 2 In the meantime, both the taxpayer and the
government remained uncertain of the tax consequences.
Further complicating matters was the fact that the Board's decision-
making lagged behind the legislative code. For example, when Congress
solved problems from previous tax acts and enacted the Revenue Act of
1939, the Board was still interpreting the Revenue Acts of 1932 and
1934 .I"3 Before his appointment to United States Supreme Court and
while serving as general counsel at the Bureau, Traynor's friend and
supporter Robert H. Jackson criticized the interwar tax system, stating:
"Some of the complexity, conflict and confusion in the tax law is due to
the number of cooks who make the broth."' 4 While testifying before the
Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance, Jackson claimed:
"Many cases resulting in long periods of confusion and uncertainty in
large litigation, and many unfair results could be cited in which the delay
in learning what law the Court would apply has been responsible."'0 5
Appearing in front of Bureau tax lawyers, Jackson also noted: "You
99. Id. at 1396.
Ioo. In fiscal year 1936-1937, over i1% ($1,745,203) of the total amount assessed after hearing
Board decisions proved uncollectible. In fiscal year 1937-1938, jeopardy assessments totaling
$45,867,553 in taxes, interest, and penalties were made in respect to 2,327 income tax returns. Id. at
1397.
ioI. Id. at 1393.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1398.
104. Robert H. Jackson, Equity in the Administration of Federal Taxes, 13 TAX MAG. 641, 642
('935).
IO5. Id. at 644.
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might be shocked to know that [Bureau representatives] sometimes ...
take opposite sides of the same question, whichever will be to the
advantage of the revenues. I was shocked at the apparent dishonesty of
that policy."' 6
Another example of the confusion inherent in the system was the
inverted pyramid of multiple appellate reviews that produced opposite
opinions in similar federal tax matters." Taxpayers filing a tax claim
could choose among the Board of Tax Appeals, the District Courts, and
the Court of Claims. While the Board was the most popular choice, the
other tribunals had equal precedent power and were subject to an
appellate review by eleven Circuit Courts that sometimes issued
contradictory decisions, thereby causing vagueness until the Supreme
Court settled the matter (if at all).' °8 Taxpayers and their counsels used
this lack of uniformity to their advantage in devising tax schemes. They
reviewed the latest decisions in each tribunal, and chose to litigate in a
specific tribunal if they thought it would rule in their favor.'" The Bureau
was not free from those considerations, and there were situations in
which the main reason for its assertion of a deficiency was to foster a
circuit split."0
In short, the historical evidence shows that the U.S. system for
resolving tax disputes in the interwar period failed its purpose. Taxpayers
could defer their tax liability by simply looking for a glitch or ambiguity
they could use as a basis for filing a tax dispute. As a result, the
Commissioner was forced either to litigate or to settle to prevent delays
or an unfavorable precedent."' Duplicate appellate reviews of the
Board's decisions created uncertainties, and an incentive for taxpayers to
try their luck in litigating."' A dispute that went as far as the Supreme
Court could take nearly a decade to be resolved, by which time Congress
io6. Stark, supra note 24, at 185. When discussing Justice Jackson's insights on federal tax
litigation from his position as a career government lawyer, Stark described the problems of the
interwar tax adjudication:
Jackson ... focused on the delay and uncertainty associated with lengthy appellate consideration
of disputed tax issues. Disputed legal issues often festered unresolved for several years, perhaps
even decades, before the Supreme Court offered its "final" resolution. And not uncommonly...
Congress promptly amended the statute to reverse the Court's decision. Such extended
litigation, in combination with aggressively self-interested reporting positions and limitations
concerning prior taxable years, produced unfairness and complexity in the administration of the
law.
Id. at 206-o7.
Io7. For similar criticism of the interwar tax system, see generally Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., The
Tax Litigation Process: Where It Is and Where It Is Going, Herman Gold Memorial Lecture (Sept. i i,
1989), in 44 REC. Ass'N B. CITy N.Y. 825 (1989).
to8. Traynor, supra note 2o, at 1403-04.
IO9. Id. at 1403.
iIO. Stark, supra note 24, at 200.




might have amended the statutes to provide for a different tax treatment.
With those problems in mind, Traynor partnered with Surrey and
prepared a comprehensive reform proposal."3 Its principles are described
in the next section. However, in order to understand Traynor's influence
in the field of taxation, first we have to understand how he came to the
study of tax law and to collaborate with Surrey. An outline of Traynor's
life story and his acquaintance with Surrey will be presented, followed by
a detailed discussion of their idea of preventive tax policy.
III. PREVENTIVE TAX POLICY
A. TRAYNOR'S TAX EDUCATION AND His ENCOUNTER WITH STANLEY
SURREY
There is no sounder currency in the courts across the country than a
Traynor opinion.'
Roger J. Traynor was born on February 12, i9oo, ' the son of Irish
immigrants who settled in the small town of Park City, Utah.' 7 He
received both his Ph.D. in political science and J.D. in the spring of
1927."18 While studying law, Traynor discovered his passion for tax law,
and soon thereafter, he received an appointment as a tax law professor at
U.C. Berkeley's Boalt Hall." 9 Traynor taught a course called "Principles
of Income and Inheritance Taxation," using a unique method of
combining dry law with complex tax policy and jurisprudence
considerations, exposing students to both the practical and philosophical
aspects of taxation.'20 His influence over his students encouraged many of
them to pursue careers in the field of taxation.,
As a man of many interests, Traynor enjoyed putting his practical
knowledge of tax law to use in the public service. In 1932, Traynor
advised the California State Board of Equalization on devising methods
113. Id. at336.
114. Walter V. Schaefer, The Supreme Court of California, 1981-1982, In Memoriam -Roger John
Traynor: A Judge's Judge, 7I CAL. L. REV. 1050, 1051 (1983).
115. Elizabeth Roth, The Two Voices of Roger Traynor, 27 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 269, 288 0983).
116. James R. McCall, Roger Traynor: Teacher, Jurist, and Friend, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 741, 743
(1984).
117. BEN FIELD, ACTIVISM IN PURSUIT OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CHIEF
JUSTICE ROGER J. TRAYNOR 2 (2003).
i8. McCall, supra note 116. Inspired by Thomas Reed Powell, his constitutional law professor,
Traynor decided to pursue a law degree while working on his dissertation and teaching in the political
science department. Id. at 743.
ri9. EDWARD JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES OF CALIFORNIA, 1900-1950, at
182-93 (1966).
12o. Adrian A. Kragen, In Memoriam: Roger J. Traynor: Chief Justice Traynor and the Law of
Taxation, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 8oi (1984).
121. Id. at 802.
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of local taxation to raise additional revenue.'" He helped in drafting the
retail sales tax,'23 the use tax,'24 the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax
Act' 5 and the Personal Income Tax Act of 1935.126 Those state taxes
survived battles challenging their constitutionality, and served as models
in many states and countries as central sources of local revenue.'27 In
1937, while Traynor was a tax counsel to California's Board of
Equalization, he was appointed consulting expert in the Federal Office of
the Secretary of the Treasury. ,8 Throughout his federal service, Traynor
collaborated with Surrey on ways to improve the federal tax
administration system.
Traynor and Surrey worked together at the Treasury Department,
and shared a passion for tax law. In 1937, Traynor became a consultant
expert to the Treasury and chose Surrey, then a young assistant
legislative counsel at the Treasury, as a reliable co-author and
collaborator."9 One of their mutual projects was to review the effort to
prevent taxpayers' misuse of the statute of limitations on deficiencies and
refunds. 3° Their recommendations were incorporated into section 820 of
the 1938 Revenue Act.'
3
'
Traynor and Surrey continued to develop a critical analysis of
contemporary tax problems. Their tax policy sought to balance the need
to effectively collect revenue with the fundamental principal of taxation
in accordance with the ability of taxpayers to pay.'32 Their goal was to
122. See id.
123. Retail Sales Tax Act of 1933, ch. 1020, 1933 Cal. Stat. 2599.
124. Use Tax Act of 1935, ch. 361, 1935 Cal. Stat. 1297.
125. Act of Mar. i, 1929, ch. 13, 1929 Cal. Stat. I9.
126. Personal Income Tax Act, ch. 659, 1943 Cal. Stat. 2354.
127. Kragen, supra note 12o, at 802.
128. See id. Since there were provisions of the Executive Order of 1873 prohibiting federal
employees from holding office under any state, territorial or municipal government, President
Roosevelt had to use his vested authority and sign a waiver to permit Roger Traynor to hold this
position. See Exec. Order No. 77o8, 2 Fed. Reg. 2167 (Sept. 16, 1937).
129. Although Traynor and Surrey wrote two articles together on their preventive tax policy
project, the first article appeared only with Traynor as its author. Traynor acknowledged Surrey's
contribution: "At his own request the name of Mr. Stanley S. Surrey does not appear as co-author,
although this article could not have been written without his unselfish interest and cooperation."
Traynor, supra note 2o, at 1393, n.*.
130. Traynor collaborated with Professors John M. Maguire and Stanley S. Surrey and proposed a
complete revision of the administrative provisions of the income tax system. The three professors
wrote a series of articles explaining this reform and the remaining loopholes that need to be closed.
See, e.g., John M. Maguire, Stanley S. Surrey & Roger J. Traynor, Section 82o of the Revenue Act of
1938,48 YALE L. J. 509 (1939).
131. Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-554, § 820, 52 Stat. 447,581-83.
132. Traynor & Surrey, supra note I5, at 336 (194o). The principle of "ability to pay" denotes the
theory of progressive taxation by which the government imposes gradually increasing tax rates as the
income to which the rate is applied increases. See Slade M. Kendrick, The Ability-to-Pay Theory of
Taxation, 29 AM. EcoN. REV. 92 (Mar., 1939) (describing the justification for this policy).
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create what they called a "preventive tax policy."' 33 The goal of the policy
was two-fold: to prevent tax disputes from arising, or reaching the
judicial system, by improving the predictability, clarity and unity of the
tax code (ex ante prevention), and to produce more effective
administrative and judicial procedures for the swift resolution of those
that did arise (ex post treatment).
B. ExANTE PREVENTIVE TAX POLICY
i. Precluding Initiation of Disputes
Traynor and Surrey thought it was essential for the tax system to
attain equilibrium between equality and complexity.' " Such a balance,
they said, is like "an arrangement of cargo for the holds of a ship if they
are to equilibrate the incidence of a variety of taxes."'35 Much of the
complexity of the tax system is designed to protect taxpayers by creating
progressive tax rates, various tax deductions, and credits. Those
measures serve to regulate and redistribute society's resources.
Nevertheless, they believed, the tax system must also retain a sufficient
level of simplicity.':
As a first step toward avoiding tax disputes, Traynor and Surrey
urged making the tax code clearer for two reasons. First, complex
regulations without proper guidelines or clarification force taxpayers to
"construe them at their peril."'37 Second, predictability of the law is
essential for society, as taxpayers who are overwhelmed by the scope of
the law are unable to fully comply with it.'38 As new circumstances arise
over time, complicated tax rules make it difficult for taxpayers to know
what the tax implications will be for a given transaction. Taxpayers seek
confidence when planning their business and family affairs, and any
vagueness can result in unnecessary tax litigation.'39
2. Advancing the Administrative Disposition of Tax Disputes
The next step, Traynor and Surrey emphasized, is to improve the
function of preliminary administrative negotiations between the taxpayer
and the local revenue agent, because a great number of the deficiencies,
particularly in small cases, could have been disposed of that way.4 They
133. Traynor & Surrey, supra note 15, at 352.
134. Id. at 336. Justice Robert H. Jackson was one of the critics of the complexity of the interwar
tax system. Stark, supra note 24, at 187. Further, he opposed the notion that complexity might serve
other important purposes, such as fairness. Id. He criticized the "elaborate procedural apparatus as
institutional overkill in the need of reform." Id.
135. Traynor & Surrey, supra note 15, at 336.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 353.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 338.
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stressed the need for competent and fair handling of initial negotiations
in order to provide the taxpayer with an informal, non-judicial, and
inexpensive opportunity to settle the matter. If necessary, a case of
particular importance could be further clarified by a conference of tax
experts at the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The purpose of the
conference would be to provide responsible examination of the issue
and, at its conclusion, produce an official report.'4 ' At the end of this
process, the taxpayer would be confident the case had been thoroughly
considered, and both parties would be ready to defend their position in a
judicial proceeding if necessary.'42
If the matter was not settled in the conference, the commissioner
would notify the taxpayer regarding the proposed deficiency, and the
taxpayer could reply by filing a detailed protest to the commissioner. '
The taxpayer would be required to give a full disclosure of the facts in
the protest letter and provide a statement of all the transactions involved.
Failure to file would result in a deficiency letter.'" The proposed protest
would be in writing, under oath, and contain all the information and
documents relevant to the case. They emphasized that the statement
would thus clear all factual issues and restrict any remaining controversy
to legal questions. Furthermore, Traynor and Surrey suggested that the
highest-ranking experts in the bureau should review this statement
because they had the authority to correct the mistakes of their office and
to prevent unnecessary litigation.'45
The proposed protest procedure would shift the burden of proof to
the taxpayer, making it the latter's responsibility to disclose information
in his or her complete control. 46 It aimed to eliminate the ineffectiveness
of the existing mechanism, which at that time provided poor and
inadequate information.' 47 The proposed disclosure requirement, which
cost the taxpayer little because all the facts were in his or her possession,
was crucial to the determination of the matter, and was in accordance
with the self-assessment principle by which a return is filed. By the end of
the protest procedure, the commissioner would issue a final deficiency
notice, stating the specific finding, allowing the taxpayer to make a
rational decision whether to pursue the matter with the Board of Tax
Appeals.' 4' Further structure would be imposed on this process as well.
141. Id. at 343.
142. Id. at 344.
143. id. at 339.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 344.
146. Id.
147. On average, about 67.4% of the total amount of deficiencies, which the Commissioner was
forced to abandon, reveal the difficulty of attempting to determine tax liabilities without full and
accurate information. Traynor, supra note 20, at 1401.
148. Traynor & Surrey, supra note 15, at 340-4.
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For example, during the hearing before the Board of Tax Appeals, the
taxpayer would be confined to the grounds, documents and facts outlined
in his protest. Likewise, the commissioner would be limited to the finding
of facts in the deficiency notice.,4 9
3. The Origins of the Closing Agreement and Private Letter Ruling
Further thinking on ways to improve the communication between
the government and taxpayers led Traynor and Surrey to propose a two-
step preventive tax policy, known today as the "private letter ruling" and
"closing agreement." A "private letter ruling" is a written statement
issued to a taxpayer by the IRS that interprets and applies the tax laws to
the taxpayer's specific set of facts. Once issued, a letter ruling may be
revoked or modified unless it is accompanied by a closing agreement. '5o
A "closing agreement" is an agreement between the taxpayer and the
government on the tax consequence of a specific set of facts. It is usually
requested by the taxpayer who provides all facts and documentation and
shows good reasons for requesting an agreement with the government.
The agreement can address either the specific transaction or the total
liability of the taxpayer.'
Traynor and Surrey proposed to establish a method of customized
"declaratory administrative ruling" designed to determine the tax
consequences of proposed transactions.'52 Furthermore, they suggested
forming a binding "closing agreement" between the commissioner and
the taxpayer, approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, which would
end all disputes related to the facts at hand.'53
Their proposal improved the existing closing agreements of that time
by adding that agreements should relate to either a particular
transaction's present or future tax consequences, whether it was an issue
of fact or law.'54 The proposed procedures would thus enable taxpayers to
ascertain the Bureau's stand on a given future transaction. Furthermore,
their proposal would not only inform taxpayers of the Bureau's position
on current tax issues (as issued in private letter rulings), but also would
allow them to plan ahead as to whether to accept the administration's
opinion and enter into an agreement with the Bureau (closing
agreement), or proceed with litigating the matter in the courts.'55 For
example, a taxpayer who wants to establish a trust in which he will retain
some control of the flow of income to various beneficiaries can request
the Bureau's ruling that the income is not taxable to him as a grantor,
149. Id. at 344.
150. Rev. Proc. 92-1, 1992-I I.R.B. 519.
151. Rev. Proc. 68-16, 1968-I I.R.B. 246.
152. Traynor & Surrey, supra note 15, at 353-56.
153. Id. at 354-56.




and then enter into a binding agreement on those facts for the duration
of the trust.
Traynor and Surrey claimed that applying binding agreements to
current and future transactions, not justpast transactions, would benefit
both the taxpayer and the government.'5 The government would benefit
because litigation overload would be reduced, as the agreement would
prevent taxpayers from arguing later for a different tax result. Taxpayers
would enjoy protection from future changes in administrative or judicial
resolutions regarding the subject matter of the agreement.'57 If such
changes occurred, the Bureau would have to apply the previous tax
treatment stated in the binding agreement with the taxpayer.
C. Ex Posr TAX POLICY
After a tax matter had already reached the point of formal litigation,
reducing the time recuired for a resolution was the primary concern for
Traynor and Surrey."
i. Reducing the Incentive to Litigate
One of the apparent problems in the late 1930s was the obvious
incentive that taxpayers had to file a petition with the Board of Tax
Appeals. Filing with the Board did not require prepayment of tax
liability.'59 Thus, when given the choice between two identical
procedures, taxpayers opted for the one that deferred their tax liability
and did not involve initial payment.' 6° Traynor and Surrey recommended
extending the Board's jurisdiction to include not only refund cases (when
the taxpayer files for recovery of paid taxes) but also deficiency
procedures initiated by the Bureau when tax liability was alleged to be
higher than what was reported by the taxpayer. ' Thereafter they
proposed that the taxpayer be required to post a bond prior to filing a
petition with the Board in order to secure the collectibility of tax by the
Bureau later on. 62 The proposed bond, they said, should not exceed the
amount of deficiency in question excluding interest, and the taxpayer
would be able to replace it at any time with other forms of security.'63
The Board would have the authority to waive this security
requirement. '
156. Id. at 355.
157. Id. At that time, Congress did not want to limit this legislative freedom, thus both the
regulations and each particular closing agreement stated that the agreement was subject to future
change in the statutory law. Id.
158. Id. at 345.
159. See id. at 338.
16o. Id. at 347.
16r. Id. at 347-48.
162. Traynor, supra note 20, at 1433-35.




An additional method of lowering the volume of tax litigation,
suggested Traynor and Surrey, was imposing a requirement to use
administrative procedures before filing a lawsuit.6 ' They recommended
adopting an exhaustion-of-remedies doctrine in tax matters, which would
require that certain administrative procedures be initiated and followed
before taxpayers could seek relief from the Board or the courts.'
2. The Establishment of a Single Court of Tax Appeals
Multiple appellate reviews of Board of Tax Appeals decisions
created conflicting decisions and uncertainties in the interwar period.
Due to differences of opinions among the circuit courts, a decision
granted in one circuit court did not close the door to litigating the matter
in another circuit court in hope of reaching a different outcome. 6 For
example, in 1930 the Board of Tax Appeals denied a deduction made by
a taxpayer for a loss on a sale of property to his wholly owned
corporation.'6 That decision was reversed in a matter brought before the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in i934, '69 and the
Supreme Court denied certiorari.'70 The Second, Eighth and Ninth
Circuit Courts of Appeals subsequently rendered similar decisions in
such loss deduction cases brought before them."' However, in 1939, the
Board's view was reconfirmed by a decision of the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals.'72 Consequently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and
held that such losses were not deductible.
3
In order to eliminate such uncertainties and to achieve uniformity in
tax adjudication, Traynor and Surrey suggested passing the exclusive
authority to decide cases of income, estate, and gift tax to the Board of
Tax Appeals. This proposal aimed to transfer the review of tax disputes
to professional tax experts who were better qualified than the average
district court judge.'74 As for appellate review, they recommended
establishing a single Court of Tax Appeals, which would have sole
appellate jurisdiction over the Board's decisions."' The proposed court
165. Traynor, supra note 20, at 1411 i8.
i66. Id. at 1412, 1417.
167. Traynor & Surrey, supra note 15, at 349-52.
i68. Jones v. Comm'r, 18 B.T.A. 1225, 1230 (1930).
169. Jones v. Helvering, 71 F.2d 214, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1934).
170. Helvering v. Jones, 293 U.S. 583 (1934).
171. Helvering v. Johnson, 104 F.2d I4O, I44 (8th Cir. 1939); Smith v. Higgins, 102 F.2d 456, 458
(2d Cir. 1939); Foster v. Comm'r, 96 F.2d 130, 133 (2d Cir. 1938); Comm'r v. McCreery, 83 F.2d 817
(9th Cir. 1936); Comm'r v. Eldridge, 79 F.2d 629, 631 (9th Cir. 1935); see also Traynor & Surrey, supra
note 15, at 350.
172. Comm'r v. Griffiths, 103 F.2d 110, 114 (7th Cir. 1939).
173. Comm'r v. Griffiths, 308 U.S. 355 (1939).
174. Traynor & Surrey, supra note I5, at 345-48.
175. Id. Traynor and Surrey provided other options to establishing a Court of Tax Appeals, such as




would supervise the divisions of the Board and promulgate the
regulations governing their procedure. Appeals from the Court of Tax
Appeals would require a grant of certiorari from the Supreme Court. If
certiorari were denied, the Court of Tax Appeals decision would
constitute a final, binding resolution on the parties, not an invitation to
further litigate the matter, as was the practice at the time. 76
IV. PREVENTIVE TAX POLICY: DEFEATED?
After this joint project, Traynor and Surrey parted ways. Surrey
joined the law faculty at Berkeley and then Harvard and continued his
public service, while Traynor was nominated to the Supreme Court of
California. Their proposals to improve the interwar tax system were not
fully accepted. While trying to put their innovative philosophy of
preventive tax policy into practice, they encountered the limitations of
reality and political constraints. Specifically, the operative part of their
proposal aroused a storm of criticism. 77 Nevertheless, parts of their
proposal were later adopted, contributing greatly to the development of
the U.S. tax system. Furthermore, from his distinguished bench, Traynor
promoted the philosophy of preventive tax policy when presented with
state tax cases. This section presents the practice of preventive tax policy
in Traynor's state tax decisions, along with historical review of the
implementation of Traynor and Surrey's proposal in federal tax law, then
and today.
A. THE TRAYNOR SYSTEM OF TAX ADJUDICATION
Traynor's nomination to the Supreme Court of California did not
mark the end of his proposal for a preventive tax policy, but rather the
beginning of its practice. In 1940, Traynor was appointed to the Supreme
Court after a public debate over an earlier appointee.' Governor
Culbert Olson had nominated Max Radin, Traynor's old Berkeley
colleague, to the state Supreme Court, but the State Qualifications
Committee rejected this appointment fearing Radin's radical
tendencies.'79 Olson called Radin to ask his advice on a substitute
nominee, and Radin recommended Traynor.'8° Appointed when he was
176. Traynor, supra note 20, at 1427-29.
177. See, e.g., Montgomery B. Angell, Procedural Reform in the Judicial Review of Controversies
Under the Internal Revenue Statutes: An Answer to a Proposal, 34 ILL. L. REV. 151 (1939); E. Barrett
Prettyman, A Comment on the Traynor Plan for Revision of Federal Tax Procedure, 27 GEO. L.J. 1O38
(1939); J.S. Seidman, Proposed Procedural Changes in Federal Tax Practice, 67 J. ACCOUNTANCY 221
(1939); William A. Sutherland, New Roads to the Settlement of Tax Controversies: A Critical Comment,
7 LAW & CONTEMP PROBS. 359 (1940); Aaron G. Youngquist, Proposed Radical Changes in the Federal
Tax Machinery, 25 A.B.A. J. 291 (1939).
178. Schaefer, supra note 114, at 1050.
179. Traynor Named to High Bench, Olson Raps Commission for Rejecting Max Radin, Another
U.C. Educator, L.A. TIMES, Aug. I, 1940, at I.
I8o. FIELD, supra note 3, at 5.
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forty years old, Traynor was the youngest member of the California
Supreme Court and the first academic lawyer appointed to the Court."'
He served as Chief Justice from 1964 until his retirement in 1970.182
In the beginning of the 193os, the jurisprudential ideas of Legal
Realism emerged as a reaction to formalism, and later attracted many
New Deal jurists.8' To some, Roger Traynor might seem typical of many
liberal New Dealers in his belief in administrative expertise and judicial
passivity. '84 However, a closer look at his jurisprudence reveals a more
complex outlook on law, reform, and the role of the judge as
policymaker. Exposed to the ideas of Realism by his Berkeley professor,
Thomas Reed Powell, Traynor believed judges should not direct their
opinion by their desired outcome but should look beyond the mere facts
of the case and consider social and environmental data.
s5
Consequently, in his judicial decisions, Traynor advocated his
preventive tax policy by grounding the tax code in the real world.
Although he resented the phrase "judicial activism,"' 6 he felt it was
important for judges to employ "judicial creativity ' 7 to overrule old
precedents and bridge gaps between tax law and the constantly changing
everyday world. Only those innovations that connect the law with reality
and social changes are desired legal changes, those that venture "new
answers to old questions." '88 Accordingly, in Sutter-Yuba Investment Co.
I8I. James R. McCall, A Basic Concern for Process: Commentary on Quo Vadis, Prospective
Overruling, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 8o6 (1999).
182. Kragen, supra note I.
183. Neil Duxbury contended that realist jurisprudence was never a "revolt against formalism" and
the movement away from formalist legal thinking was very slow and hesitant. NEIL DUXBURY,
PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 3 0995). In his opinion there was no realist movement; it was
nothing more than an "intellectual mood" and "a complex array of messages, some of which seemed
rather feeble once placed in an institutional context." Id. at 4.
184. For a discussion of the effect of New Deal lawyers in the judiciary see Sanford N. Greenberg,
Ironies of Administrative Law, 72 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 1349 (1997); Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory
and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CH.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1055-59 (I997). For an intellectual history of
the New Deal legal thinking, see generally PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS (1982); LAURA
KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927-I960 (1986). For a comprehensive analysis of American legal
realism, see generally LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2002);
MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 187o-I96o: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
ORTHODOXY (1992); WILLIAM NELSON, THE LEGALIST REFORMATION: LAW, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY IN
NEW YORK 1920-I980 (2OOI).
185. Roger J. Traynor, Better Days in Court for a New Day's Problem, 17 VAND. L. REV. 109, 109
(1963).
186. A term used to describe the Supreme Court's use of its interpretation power to achieve social
goals. Activist judges, Traynor thought, undermine the law by making too many changes that impair
its stability. FIELD, supra note 3, at 12.
187. An analytical and creative judge "bears no relation to that ill-defined character, the so-called
judicial activist." Roger J. Traynor, The Limits of Judicial Creativity, 63 IOWA L. REV. I, 2 (1977).
Judicial creativity, he theorized, occurs when the judge succeeds in persuading the involved parties and
the legal community of the necessity of modifying existing law. Id.
188. Robert B. McKay, Constitutional Law: Idea in the Public Forum, 53 CAL. L. REV. 67, 67
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v. Waste,' 9 Traynor bridged the gap between the "dry law" and the new
reality he faced in this case.'" He decided that although state law allowed
taxpayers the right of redemption until disposal of their property, it does
not allow them to escape paying their taxes while local authorities held
on to their delinquent property.'9 '
In further attempt to promote his preventive tax policy Traynor
engaged in clear and consistent interpretation of the law that would give
guidance to taxpayers and allow them to predict the tax implications of
future transactions. In his opinion, the role of the judge was significant in
preserving the consistency, predictability, and unity of the law.
Inconsistent decisions puzzled both taxpayers and the administration,
and created incentives to litigate in order to achieve different results.
One way of promoting this consistency was by looking to the legislative
intent behind the tax law. By tethering the letter of the law to the
purposes behind it, as expressed in the legislative history, Traynor could
help ensure that the law would be interpreted consistently over time, and
not be subject to the vagaries of different and conflicting judicial
understanding. Thus, in the case of Roehm v. Orange County, Traynor
exhibited this interpretative style by examining the legislative history of
article XIII, section 14 of the California Constitution and concluding that
liquor licenses were not historically intended to be subject to ad valorem
taxation.92
(1965).
i89. Sutter-Yuba Inv. Co. v. Waste, 136 P.2d iI, 12 (Cal. 1943). Although this seemed to be a
straightforward redemption of property case, it had significant consequences for the overall process of
calculating the tax liability on delinquent property. In this case, the taxpayer contended he should not
have to pay taxes imposed on delinquent property for the years it was held by the local government.
Id. at 12.
19o. Id. at 14. A tax policy issue was at stake that could seriously affect the redemption process of
tax delinquent property. Traynor decided to reject the taxpayer's contention, and stated that taxes for
that period must be included in calculating the redemption cost. He considered the inevitable
repercussions of a decision to accept the taxpayer's interpretation of the law. "If [the county] did not
require that redemption prices take into account taxes imposed had the property not been deeded to
the state, owners would find it advantageous to allow their property to be deeded to the state with the
inte'ntion of delaying redemption as long as possible to escape taxes that attended ownership." Id.
191. Id. Twenty years later, another tax redemption case came to Traynor's desk. People v. Lucas,
36o P.2d 321 (Cal. I96i). This time Traynor believed that a wrong judgment might give taxpayers an
incentive to loot their tax-deeded property before its seizure by the government. Id. at 324. The
defendants in this case sold timber cut from tax-deeded land. When they were required to pay their
taxes, they claimed the amount they paid to redeem the property included taxes on the value added to
the land by the timber before it was removed. They asserted that by paying a redemption price based
on the value of the land including the timber, they have in effect paid the state for the timber. Id. at
322. In rejecting their contention, Traynor was concerned that owners of tax-deeded property would
extract its natural resources and then argue that the harvest is excluded from the tax deed on the
property. Id. at 324.
192. 196 P.2d 550, 556-57 (Cal. 1948). Traynor demonstrated how the framers of the amendments
of Article XIII and generations of Supreme Court decisions sustained the view that only intangibles
listed in the Constitution were taxable property. Id. at 563. Foreseeing the administrative problems of
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Another goal of Traynor's preventive tax policy was to give clarity to
the law by using lots of details and examples in his tax opinions, perhaps
drawing his experiences as a teacher and scholar on the bench. Hence,
his opinions employed a sort of scientific, pedagogical air to them by
portraying his decisions as an objective analysis of the facts and
inevitable result of the public interest.'93 His thoughtful opinions
provided extensive details and examples, in the hope that these careful
expositions would guide taxpayers, Bureau agents and fellow judges in
future cases, thus preventing further litigation. For example, in Estate of
Law v. Kirkwood, Traynor provided details and examples of how to
compute marital deductions in the estate tax.'94 Similar to a textbook
solution, Traynor constructed a table comparing the controller's
computation to the executor's computation, followed by a detailed
explanation of their differences, and supported by relevant sections of
the Revenue Code. Thus, this decision appeared to be more a "class
exercise" than a traditional judicial opinion and involved a deep
understanding of accounting. It was important to Traynor to explain and
demonstrate his calculations so it would be clear for future estate
executors how to apply the convoluted law.'95
future taxation of intangible property, Traynor noted that among the absurdities of such taxation
would be taxing life insurance policies, which would result in increasing tax avoidance by exchanging
taxable intangible assets for tax-free intangible assets. Id. at 556. To be cautious, Traynor added that in
case the Legislature was not satisfied with his ruling in this matter, it has the vested power to change
the terms of the license. Id. at 557. Familiar with the bureaucracy and the legislation process, Traynor
warned that such a change should be accomplished by a proper constitutional ratification process and
not by an administrative procedure. Id.
193. This process of inquiry is similar to the Pragmatists' concept of scientific method. See FIELD,
supra note 3, at 9-14. Legal pragmatism is a nineteenth century philosophic school that emphasized
the importance of context and the eclectic nature of the law. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW,
PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003) (discussing principles of legal pragmatism).
194. Estate of Law v. Kirkwood, 325 P.2d 449, 449, 451 (Cal. 1958). In this case, the deceased's will
provided that his estate taxes should be paid out of the residuary estate. The controller subtracted all
the allowable deductions including federal estate tax from the fair market value of the estate. Then the
controller declared half of the remainder of the estate as a marital deduction. Id. at 449. The executor
of the will objected to this calculation arguing that the marital deduction should have been subtracted
from the fair market value of the estate prior to the deduction of the federal estate tax. Id. at 451.
Traynor affirmed the controller's computation, holding the marital deduction was properly
determined. He detailed the way to compute the estate tax by first subtracting federal estate taxes to
ascertain the clear market value of the estate. Traynor stated the marital deduction should be
determined only then, and from that clear market value. Id. at 451.
195. Another example of Traynor's academic opinions came a few years later, in the dissenting
opinion of Rosemary Properties v. McColgan, 177 P.2d 757, 766 (Cal. 1947). At issue was the matter of
the deductibility of dividends received by a corporation under section 8(h) of the Bank and
Corporation Franchise Tax Act. Id. at 758. The majority opinion in this case agreed with the plaintiff,
holding that any dividend paid from earnings and profits would be a dividend paid out of income
included in the measure of the tax and, as such, the recipient corporation was exempt from franchise
tax on that dividend. Id. at 762. In a long and detailed dissenting opinion, Traynor incorporated an
illustration of the differences between "income" and "earning and profits"; the latter included a
deduction of federal taxes. Id. at 767. Next, Traynor provided a mathematical example to demonstrate
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Finally, in an effort to prevent unnecessary tax litigation by
encouraging administrative settlement of tax controversies (ex post
preventive tax policy), Traynor established a judicial rule by which
taxpayers must provide full information and properly communicate with
the administrative agencies in order to be eligible to seek judicial relief.
Accordingly, in West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, he established a
requirement that taxpayers provide the Bureau with the necessary
information prior to filing a lawsuit with the court.' The taxpayer,
Traynor held, cannot call upon the court's help to determine whether
agencies acted properly when it refuses to submit issues of fact to such
agencies.' In Star-Kist Foods v. Quinn,"98 Traynor continued to
implement this idea by establishing a rule that taxpayers could not
receive remedies from the court unless they had exhausted their
remedies with the tax administration.'"
the differences between "net income" and "earning and profits." Id. at 768. His opinion detailed the
majority's mistake of allowing the plaintiff to declare dividends out of "earning and profits" in excess
of the "net income" even though no tax was paid on this excess. Id.
196. West Pub. Co. v. McColgan, 166 P.2d 861, 865 (Cal. 1946). In this case, the taxpayer was a
Minnesota corporation engaged in the business of selling law books and other publications. The
corporation shipped its books to California from orders taken in California by its employees. Id. at
862. However, it refused to file returns under the California Income Tax Act or to furnish any
information requested by the commissioner, claiming that the tax levied under the Bank and
Corporation Income Tax Act was an unconstitutional California tax on a foreign corporation engaged
in interstate commerce. Id. at 862-63. Without the information he requested, the commissioner had no
choice but to acquire data from the State Board of Equalization and to estimate the company's
income. Id. at 865.
197. Id. Traynor concluded that taxpayers cannot complain of errors in the computation of their
tax liability when they refuse to avail themselves of administrative remedies to prevent or correct such
errors. Id.
598. Star-Kist Foods v. Quinn, 54 Cal. 2d 507 (Cal. i96o). The issue in this case was erroneous
assessments. Although the taxpayer had the option to apply to the Board of Equalization for the
correction of his return, he instead filed a claim in court seeking a writ of mandate against the tax
assessor to cancel the assessments. Id. at 509. Traynor was familiar with this issue, as he had written
extensively on the problem of the taxpayer's choice according to the affordability of the dispute
resolution mechanism. He claimed that taxpayers often chose the less-expensive option of filing a
court claim before exhausting other appellate mechanisms, which overloaded the court system with
unnecessary litigation. Id. at 511. Reversing the trial court judgment, Traynor held that since the only
issue was the constitutionality of California's Tax Code, the taxpayer was not required to file with the
Board of Equalization before it sought a judicial determination. However, since the taxpayer had a
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by paying the tax under protest and
then seeking to recover it, the court held that the writ of mandate was not available to the taxpayer. Id.
at 5IO.
199. Star-Kist Foods, 354 P.2d at 3.
Star-Kist, however, could have obtained relief by paying its taxes under protest and suing
for recovery thereof .... Mandate is ordinarily denied when the petitioner has a plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law .... In more recent cases,
however, the adequacy of such remedies has been considered and mandate has been
denied.... The fact that Star-Kist filed its petition for mandate before the assessment was
complete, however, does not affect the adequacy of its remedy by payment of taxes under




B. TODAY'S IMPLEMENTATION OF PREVENTIVE TAX MEASURES
By the late 1930s, the idea of a tax appellate tribunal had gained
momentum primarily due to Traynor and Surrey's proposal.2" However,
eventually Congress rejected the proposal to establish a single Court of
Tax Appeals because some of its members refused to grant life tenure
and judicial power to the Board members. Many articles have been
written on the need for final judicial authority in tax matters, 1 but the
idea has continuously been rejected by the legislative branch.202
A few years later, the Revenue Act of 1942 changed the name of the
Board to the Tax Court of the United States, elevating the status of the
Board to a judicial body and its members to judges. Over two decades
later, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 changed the court's characterization: it
would no longer be considered an agency within the executive branch
but rather a court under Article I of the Constitution (and thus enjoy a
higher status), a change which had been suggested by Traynor and
Surrey. 3 This Act also created a category of small tax cases which were
to be decided by special tax trial judges, thus removing the burden of
small tax matters from the rest of the Tax Court docket.
Nevertheless, one of the most significant changes the Tax Court has
experienced in the last decade is in its role as a fact finder, a problem
which Traynor and Surrey had raised in their reform plan. Today's Tax
Court judges are involved in pre-trial activities, and when necessary,
conduct inquiries to inform themselves about the facts of the case. 4
While judges in the past were limited to the information in the petition
or the deficiency letter, Tax Court judges today have become involved in
obtaining the necessary information themselves through modern means
of communication such as telephones, facsimiles, emails, video
conferences, and other electronic methods." Moreover, in recent times,
the Tax Court has established a preventive practice with the California
200. Justice Robert H. Jackson also recommended the establishment of a centralized tax tribunal
as a final appellate tax review, stressing its retrospective character as interpreting tax cases in light of
the tax changes over the years. He suggested that the members of the congressional committee will sit
in this court, with a notion of harmonious interpretation of the tax court. Stark, supra note 24, at I88.
201. See, e.g., Mortimer M. Caplin & Stuart L. Brown, A New U.S. Court of Tax Appeals: S. 678,57
TAXES 36o, 363 (1979); Martin D. Ginsberg, Making Tax Law Through Judicial Process, 7o A.B.A. J.
74, 75 (1984); Erwin N. Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HARv. L. REV. 1153, 1153
(1944); Stanley S. Surrey, Some Suggested Topics in the Field of Tax Administration, 25 WASH. U. L.Q.
399, 419-20 (1940). For historical overview on this idea, see Todd H. Miller, A Court of Tax Appeals
Revisited, 85 YALE L.J. 228, 228 (1975).
202. The proposal for federal judicial reform in 1997 rejected the idea of a separate court of tax
appeals and suggested it be centralized in the federal circuit system. Act of Nov. 26, 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-119, III Stat. 2440; COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF
APPEALS, I05TH CONG., FINAL REPORT 73 (1998).
203. Traynor & Surrey, supra note 15, at 351.




Bar by which special tax trial judges act as mediators in an effort to settle
cases prior to regular sessions. These developments have reduced
delays in the Tax Court's docket and enabled the parties to save
expensive judicial time.
Throughout the years, appeals from the Tax Court were confined to
"clearly erroneous cases," thus limiting appellate review to unusual
matters.2° Nonetheless, today's Tax Court appellate review is still in the
hands of the various Circuit Courts. Moreover, there is still no
requirement for prepayment of tax liability or of any bond in order to file
with the Tax Court. For these reasons and more, Traynor and Surrey's
proposals still have merit today. Their suggestions for lowering the
incentive to litigate tax matters, standardizing tax decisions and
minimizing the current tax uncertainties have not been fully achieved.
Yet, Traynor and Surrey's biggest success was enacting a provision
for binding taxpayer-government agreements. For years, the Bureau of
Internal Revenue refused to apply the idea of a "closing agreement" to
future transactions. Its caution originated in the notion that the
determination of a commissioner in one case cannot bind his successor or
other taxpayers outside the agreement9 Traynor and Surrey used their
influence in the Treasury to incorporate this mechanism of binding
taxpayer-government agreements in the Revenue Act of I938."° They
also added a requirement that taxpayers show a bona fide motive in
seeking the ruling. This measure was necessary to prevent the Bureau
from becoming a huge information authority abused by tax avoiders. I°
Moreover, the idea of a private letter ruling as we know it today
originated in Traynor and Surrey's concept of preventive tax policy and
improving taxpayer-government negotiations. Its extensive
contemporary use as a preventive mechanism for tax disputes is no doubt
a product of Traynor and Surrey's project.
Today's most challenging problem is in the area of international
taxation. Specifically, the government has been grappling with how to
address the implications of Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage, which take
advantage of inconsistencies between different countries' tax rules such
as transfer pricing transactions."' The use of these types of transactions
206. Id. at 7.
207. Id. at 4.
208. Traynor & Surrey, supra note 15, at 353.
2O9. Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-544, § 8oi, 52 Stat. 447, 573 (1938) (amending Revenue
Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-562, § 6o6, 45 Stat. 79 I , 874 (1928)). By striking the words "ending prior to
the date of the agreement" the Act established that a closing agreement may be related not only to a
past tax year already closed, but also to a present tax year not yet terminated, or to a future tax year
not yet commenced. Id. at 573.
21o. Traynor & Surrey, supra note 15, at 355.
2 11. See generally Insop Pak, International Finance and State Sovereignty: Global Governance in
the International Tax Regime, to ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 165, 165 (2004); Philip R. West, Foreign
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as a form of tax avoidance and income allocation among different taxing
jurisdictions became widespread with the development of multinational
organizations."' The phrase "transfer pricing transactions" refers to the
pricing of goods and services between a parent company and its foreign
subsidiary, or between various divisions of a multinational corporation.
Given that the parties in this transaction are clearly related, this
mechanism is used to affect the profits of different divisions in the
company, along with the company's overall tax liability, and its tax
position in various jurisdictions.
In conjunction with traditional mechanisms for confronting this
phenomenon, such as enacting laws and regulations, the U.S.
government, followed by other governments around the world,
developed Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs) to prevent future tax
litigation over international transactions."3 An APA is an agreement
between the taxpayer and the government relating to a future transaction
whereby the parties agree upon the price and time period of a specific
transaction."4 This mechanism prevents future litigation and guarantees
that the taxpayer is acting in good faith. Today there are bilateral and
multilateral APAs that involve taxing authorities in each of the countries
relevant to the transaction. These agreements protect the taxpayer from
double taxation and assessments procedures" 5 while reducing the risk of
artificial transactions designed solely to yield tax advantages.
Today's Advance Pricing Agreements constitute preventive tax
policy per se, which originated in the 1940S with Traynor and Surrey's
concept of using a closing agreement for future transactions. They
demonstrate that preventive tax policy can serve as a model for reducing
litigation and preventing controversies in other areas of the law and,
most especially, how 1940s public policy continues to shed light on
current developments in the legal system.
Traynor and Surrey's idea of preventive tax policy is especially
timely as the government struggles to improve the effectiveness, integrity
and fairness of our tax laws. Various proposals have been drafted
suggesting the transformation of our income-based tax system to one
based on a consumption tax. Some of those proposals have suggested
enacting a value-added tax, a national sales tax, or a broad individual and
Law in U.S. International Taxation: The Search for Standards, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 147, 171 (1996).
212. Reuven Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State,
113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1576 (2000).
213. For more on the emergence of APAs, see Diane M. Ring, On the Frontier of Procedural
Innovation: Advanced Pricing Agreements and the Struggle to Allocate Income for Cross Border
Taxation, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 143, i6o (2000).
214. Rev. Proc. 91-22, 1991-I C.B. 526 (defining APAs).
215. Ring, supra note 213, at 170.
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business postpaid consumption tax."16 Those proposals may revive the
need to reconsider the creation of a National Court of Tax Appeals,
simplifying the tax code and unifying deficiency and refund litigation
under a single tax court, as Traynor and Surrey proposed nearly seventy
years ago."7
CONCLUSION
As Traynor and Surrey so aptly put it, "[t]here is something basically
wrong in a procedure which enables so many cases to travel the long,
expensive and futile route up to the threshold of a judicial settlement
only to retrace their steps at that point to an administrative settlement or
to be abandoned altogether by the taxpayer or the government......
Between World War I and World War II, the United States tax
system underwent a dramatic change with the evolution of the individual
income tax. In about twenty years, the income tax went from a novel
measure that generated very little revenue to a major source of income
for the federal government."9 One of the consequences of that
development was that the tax code became very complex. Public
discontent with the system grew and tax litigation increased, along with
tax evasion."'
During the 193os, the interwar system of tax disputes involved "too
much law," and served as an open invitation for litigation.22' Multiple
appellate reviews of the Board of Tax Appeals decisions by the various
Circuit Courts enhanced tax uncertainties. Moreover, the lack of a
proper limit or precondition for a petition to the Board of Tax Appeals
clogged the system, creating huge delays and uncertainties. This situation
created negative externalities and unnecessary costs to both the
government and the taxpayer."2
Some can predict the consequences of changes in present legal
treatment based on past experience. However, there are very few who
can foresee entirely new problems and predict the effect that alternative
216. For consumption tax proposals see The Armey-Shelby Flat Tax, H.R. 2060 & S. io5o, 104th
Cong. (Ist Sess. 1995); The Nunn-Domenici USA Tax, S. 722, 104th Cong. (Ist Sess. 1995); DAVID
BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX (1986); ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX
(1995); LAURENCE S. SEIDMAN, USA TAX, A PROGRESSIVE CONSUMPTION TAX (1997); PRESIDENT'S
ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR & PRO-GRowTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA'S
TAX SYSTEM 21-22 (2005).
217. See Traynor & Surrey, supra note 15, at 349.
218. Id. at 339.
219. See STEUERLE, supra note 69, at 13; WrrrE, supra note 3o, at Ilo; Jones, supra note 69, at 685-
86.
220. Likhovski, supra note 59.
221. See Traynor, supra note 20, at 1411.
222. Id. at 1394.
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reform proposals will have on different sets of circumstances."3 In 1938
and 1939, two relatively unknown tax administrators came together to
admonish that a major overhaul of the tax system is needed. One was
Roger Traynor, who would go on to be recognized as one of the most
accomplished and brilliant state judges in U.S. history. 24 The other was
Stanley Surrey, who later would be called the greatest tax scholar of his
generation."5
Traynor and Surrey were among those who early on recognized the
growing public dislike of the convoluted tax system and formulated
solutions for improving it. They advocated a decentralized, simpler, and
more accessible system, in which the taxpayer, with the help of his
attorney and his books could solve the matter with a Bureau of Internal
Revenue technical staff member in a field office close to his residence226
They aimed to create a unified division staff powerful enough to settle
tax disputes and to expedite their resolution.27 They regarded as a
success any case that was settled by the administration and avoided
judicial or judicial-like proceedings. There was a need in the interwar
period to draw a clear conceptual line between administrative and
judicial review, crossing it only in exceptionally complicated matters.2
In addition to improving administrative settlement procedures,
Traynor and Surrey sought to prevent disputes from arising in the first
place by decreasing the friction between taxpayers and the
government. 9 They contended that it is necessary for the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches to implement the concept of a
preventive tax policy in two basic ways. First, they recommended
creating a coherent and simple tax code that would enable taxpayers to
comprehend the correct tax treatment of a given transaction.3° Second,
they argued for requiring that the taxpayer disclose complete and
accurate information in a protest letter so that the executive branch
could quickly dispose of cases that otherwise would block the system.
This disclosure of all the facts would free the judiciary to focus on legal
rather than factual questions, thus ensuring taxpayers fair and fast
application of the law to their cases."'
223. On the ability to predict legal changes, see Robert Charles Clark, The Morphogenesis of
Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L. J. 9o , 92 (1978).
224. American legal historian Harry N. Scheiber wrote, "In any list of the most admired and
influential state judges in the nation's history, Traynor stands at the very top level." FIELD, supra note
3, at ix-xi.
225. Griswold, In Memoriam: Stanley S. Surrey, supra note 7, at 335.
226. Traynor & Surrey, supra note 15, at 341.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 343.
229. Griswold, In Memoriam: Stanley S. Surrey, supra note 7, at 344.
230. Traynor, supra note 20, at 1400.
231. Id. at 1401.
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Many of the problems that plagued the interwar tax system remain
today. Tax acts have become more and more complex in their attempt to
close loopholes exploited by shrewd tax attorneys. Changes of time and
circumstances or legal treatment create uncertainties, which if not settled
immediately, develop into tax disputes. This process results in increased
tax litigation, which in turn creates contradictory and inconsistent legal
doctrines. The incentive to litigate tax matters in the court has not
lessened throughout the years. Therefore, today, these dilemmas
continue to occupy practitioners and scholars who are striving to improve
the current tax system. Traynor and Surrey called for administrative
guidance on a regular basis to prevent taxpayers from resorting to
litigation to achieve such guidance from the judiciary. By implementing
their proposals, one might hope to "return to innocence" and reduce the
uncertainties that surround tax matters, while improving the relationship
between taxpayers and the government.
Throughout their careers, Traynor and Surrey continued to promote
their philosophy of preventive tax policy. As professors, consultants, and,
in the case of Traynor, a state Supreme Court judge, they no doubt
influenced the federal and state tax systems.232 After joining the law
faculty at Harvard, Surrey advanced preventive tax policy through his
lectures. In 1961 Surrey became assistant secretary of the Treasury for
tax policy.33 While speaking in classrooms, professional conferences or
testifying before federal committees, he continued to emphasize the need
for simplifying the code as a preventive measure.34
Traynor's administrative experience established his reputation as a
tax expert and an architect of California's tax system. In an attempt to
provide as much guidance as possible to prevent the same issues from
being relitigated, Traynor's opinions resembled mathematical proofs,
containing examples, explanations, and references. He used textual
interpretation, legislative history, and frequent citations of the language
of the law to demonstrate his faithfulness to it as well as maintain the
232. On September 9, 1952, while continuing to suggest improvement of tax administration, Surrey
published a paper supporting the separation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue from the Treasury,
making it an independent agency of the executive branch. The paper was delivered in the 1952
meeting of the National Tax Association, in Toronto, Canada. Stanley S. Surrey, A Comment on the
Proposal to Separate the Bureau of Internal Revenue from the Treasury Department, 8 TAX L. REV. 155,
155 (953).
233. Griswold, In Memoriam: Stanley S. Surrey, supra note 7, at 330.
234. In one of his lectures at the University of New York at Buffalo, Surrey commented:
The achievement of tax simplification requires a high measure of sheer ingenuity mixed
with an intelligent weighing of what is valuable complexity proper to achieve needed fair-
ness and what is expendable refinement and detail .... Where simplification is possible
without pain to the taxpayers involved, and without serious loss of revenue, it will obviously
be adopted as soon as the solution is perceived.
Honorable Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Sec'y of the Treasury, The James McCormick Mitchell Lecture
at the School of Law State University of New York(April 21, 1966).
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legislative intent behind it. Traynor's opinions interpreted the text in a
straightforward way, explaining the relationship between words so
readers could accept that he was not adding new meaning but rather
applying "simple rules of grammar" and clear meaning of the text as both
reason and justice dictated.235
His insights on tax policy and his experience in both academic and
government roles echoed throughout his State tax opinions."' His
reputation allowed him to continue and advance his philosophy of
preventive tax policy through his prestigious position as California
Supreme Court justice. 37 In 1970, Traynor retired from the Supreme
Court and returned to Berkeley, where he taught and wrote dozens of
articles until his death in 1983. Although he is mostly known for his non-
tax adjudication, his legacy of preventive tax policy continues to
contribute to today's tax debate.
235. Estate of Law v. Kirkwood, 325 P.2d 449, 454 (Cal. 1958). Another example of Traynor's use
of legislative history to track legislative intent was in the case of W.F Bray v. Jones, where Traynor
examined the legislative history of the Political Code and the idea behind its amendments. 129 P.2d
357, 359 (Cal. 1942). Thus, he noted that in 1895 the Legislature adopted an amendment replacing the
word "percentage" with the word "penalty." Id. Traynor clarified that the choice of words was not
incidental and its purpose was "not to inaugurate a new concept but to lend greater precision to the
old." Id.
236. Don Barrett, Traynor's clerk and friend, called the period from 1945 to 1956 the "Long
Court" for its long and unchanged composition. Donald P. Barrett, The Supreme Court of California,
i981-I982, In Memoriam-Roger John Traynor: Master of Judicial Wisdom, 71 CAL. L. REV. Io6O
(1983). During this period Traynor became a "leading state court judge in the nation" who set a high
literary standard for judicial writing. Id.
237. Traynor wrote 892 opinions and seventy-five law review articles. FIELD, supra note 3, at t2t.
In the field of taxation, Traynor wrote about twenty-five majority opinions and over twenty dissenting
opinions. For a list of Traynor's tax decisions, see Kragen, supra note I, at 813. On the judicial
philosophy of Traynor, see John W. Poulos, The Judicial Philosophy of Roger Traynor, 46 Hastings
L.J. 1643, 1646 (1995).
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